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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
[1]  Few legal maxims have had greater resonance than the tenet that one 
is innocent until proven guilty.1  It is a principle that has been traced back 
to Roman times,2 and it entered the American legal lexicon through the 
United States Supreme Court decision Coffin v. United States.3  It has even 
been incorporated in the United Nations’1948 Declaration of Human 
Rights under article eleven, section one.4  
 
[2]  It flows logically and constitutionally from this maxim that one should 
not be punished for a crime until it has been proven that one is guilty of 
                                               
1
 See Kenneth Pennington, Innocent Until Proven Guilty:  The Origins of a Legal Maxim. 
A Ennio Cortese, ROMA: IL CIGNO GALILEO GALILEI EDIZIONI (2001), at 
http://faculty.cua.edu/pennington/Law508/InnocentGuilty.htm (last visited Sept. 4, 2005).  
Kenneth Pennington is the Kelly-Quinn Professor of Ecclesiastical and Legal History at 
The Catholic University of America Columbus School of Law.   
2
 Cathy Lynne Bosworth, Note, Pretrial Detainment: The Fruitless Search for the 
Presumption of Innocence, 47 OHIO ST. L. J. 277, 277-78 (1986).   
3
 Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895) (“[The] presumption of innocence in 
favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and its enforcement 
lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law.”). 
4
 Pennington, supra note 1.   
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that crime.5  While not directly stated in the Constitution, penumbras of 
this principle are found in several of the amendments including the Fourth, 
which prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures,6 and the Fifth and 
Fourteenth amendments, which guarantee due process before one can be 
deprived of life, liberty or property.7  The Supreme Court has made clear 
that after conviction, the Eighth Amendment protects convicted prisoners 
from excessive force.8  What the Court has not resolved are the issues of 
which amendment provides pretrial detainees with protection against the 
deliberate use of excessive force, as well as what exactly amounts to 
excessive force.9  
 
[3]  The Ninth Circuit recently held in Demery v. Arpaio that the 
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the use of webcams to stream live 
broadcasts of pre-trial detainees in various stages of the detention 
process.10  The court relied upon the Supreme Court’s Bell v. Wolfish 
decision in holding that this practice placed a hardship on the detainees 
that rose to the level of a constitutional violation.11  In so doing, the court 
made the proper decision, but appears to have used a level of 
constitutional review higher than the one dictated by the Supreme Court in 
Wolfish.   
 
A. SCOPE AND PURPOSE 
 
[4]  The focus of this note will be threefold.  First, it will explore the 
current jurisprudence surrounding pre-trial detainees.  The second focus 
will be on whether the court made the correct decision, examining in 
particular the proper standard of constitutional review.  Finally, this note 
will examine the effect Demery may have on the constitutional status of 
pre-trial detainees.   
 
B. A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF PRE-TRIAL DETAINEE JURISPRUDENCE 
                                               
5
 See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 536 (1979) (explaining that the Due Process 
Clause prevents detainees from being punished before being found guilty).   
6
 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
7
 U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend VIX.  
8
 Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986).   
9
 Id. 
10
 Demery v. Arpaio, 378 F.3d 1020, 1033 (9th Cir. 2004). 
11
 Id. at 1030.   
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[5]Pre-trial detainees are “unconvicted individuals awaiting trial, held . . . 
because they could not post bail.”12  The basic proposition is that a person 
is innocent until there is a judicial determination of guilt, and therefore, a 
person held in confinement as a pre-trial detainee cannot “be subjected to 
any form of punishment for the crime for which he is charged with.”13  
The presumption of innocence only ends once a person is convicted of a 
crime or enters a guilty plea and is sentenced.14  Although pre-trial 
detainees cannot be punished before a formal determination of guilt,15 they 
do not have all the freedoms that people who are not incarcerated enjoy.16   
 
[6]  Determining what freedoms and rights remain for pre-trial detainees 
has been a constitutional gray area.  The Supreme Court’s own 
jurisprudence on this issue has not been clear, leaving the lower courts to 
determine what those rights are.  Before the Supreme Court case Bell v. 
Wolfish, the lower courts used a “compelling necessity standard” to 
determine whether a restriction on a detainee’s rights was legitimate.17  
According to that standard, outlined by the Second Circuit in Detainees of 
the Brooklyn House of Detention for Men v. Malcolm,18 prison officials 
had to demonstrate that regulations depriving detainees of certain rights 
were “premised on a compelling necessity to secure prison safety.”19  This 
approach gave “little deference to prison administrators,” while giving 
strong deference to the presumption of innocence of those incarcerated 
and awaiting trial.20  Using the compelling necessity standard, lower 
courts held it unconstitutional to deny detainees regular contact visits,21 
                                               
 
12
 Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118, 122 n.6 (2d Cir. 1978).   
13
 Rights of Pretrial Detainees, LEGAL BULLETIN 4.1 (Lewisburg Prison Project, 
Lewisburg, P.A.), June 2000, at 1.   
14
 142 Cong. Rec. H11,133 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1996) (statement of Rep. McCollum) 
(“The presumption of innocence ends when the conviction is obtained.”). 
15
 Pippins v. Adams County Jail, 851 F. Supp. 1228, 1232 (C.D. Ill. 1994).   
16
 Magill v. Lee County, 990 F. Supp. 1382, 1387 (M.D. Ala. 1998).   
17
 Detainees of the Brooklyn House of Det. for Men v. Malcolm, 520 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 
1975). 
18
 Id.   
19
 Bosworth, supra note 2, at 279.   
20
 Id.  
21
 Marcera v. Chinlund, 595 F.2d 1231, 1237 (2d Cir. 1979).  
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censor their mail, regulate their reading material, or monitor their 
telephone usage.22 
 
[7]  An important shift away from the presumption of innocence occurred 
in the Fifth Circuit decision Jones v. Diamond.23  The court held that, even 
though “pretrial detainees have not yet been convicted of any offense and 
are accorded the presumption of innocence when brought to trial, . . . the 
fact remains that they are being held on probable cause to believe that they 
are, in fact, guilty of a violation of the criminal statutes.”24  This ruling 
helped encourage the judiciary to view the pre-trial detainee issue as one 
of probable guilt rather than one of presumed innocence.25   
 
[8]  Jones set the foundation for Bell v. Wolfish, likely the most important 
Supreme Court ruling on the scope of the rights of pre-trial detainees 
during their period of confinement.26  The majority in Demery relied upon 
Wolfish when it held that the use of webcams in jailhouses violated the 
rights of pretrial detainees.27  In Wolfish, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing 
for the majority, focused on whether the prison conditions at Manhattan’s 
Metropolitan Correctional Center (MCC), specifically its policy of double-
bunking detainees, constituted a prohibited constitutional punishment.28   
 
[9]  The majority’s holding first abolished the compelling necessity 
standard as it applied to pre-trial detainees, ruling that it failed to find a 
constitutional basis to support the standard in the Due Process Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment.29  The Court also discussed the presumption of 
                                               
22
 Milwaukee County Jail v. Petersen, 353 F. Supp. 1157 (E.D. Wis. 1973).   
23
 Jones v. Diamond, 594 F.2d 997 (5th Cir. 1979). 
24
 Id. at 1003-04. 
25
 Bosworth, supra note 2, at 281.   
26
 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).   
27
 Demery v. Arpaio, 378 F.3d 1020, 1029-31 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 
535-39, 543), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2961 (2005). 
28
 Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520. 
29
 Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 532.  
We do not doubt that the Due Process Clause protects a detainee from 
certain conditions and restrictions of pretrial detainment.  Nonetheless, 
that Clause provides no basis for application of a compelling-necessity 
standard to conditions of pretrial confinement that are not alleged to 
infringe any other, more specific guarantee of the Constitution. 
   Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 533. 
 Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XII, Issue1 
 5
innocence doctrine at some length, acknowledging the important role it 
plays in the criminal justice system.30  However, without explaining his 
reasoning, Chief Justice Rehnquist held that the presumption of innocence 
“has no application to a determination of the rights of a pretrial detainee 
during confinement before his trial has even begun.”31 
 
[10]  Having rejected the innocence-presuming, compelling necessity 
standard, the Court then held that the proper inquiry is whether the 
conditions that pretrial detainees are subjected to “amount to punishment 
of the detainee.”32  In language cited by the majority’s opinion in Demery, 
the Court held that, “under the Due Process Clause, a detainee may not be 
punished prior to an adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process 
of law.”33   
 
[11]  The Court’s reasoning on the matter did not end with that statement, 
for the majority also held that even though prison inmates do retain certain 
constitutional rights, those rights are not necessarily guaranteed.34  The 
Court stated that those rights may be burdened “if a particular condition or 
restriction of pretrial detention is reasonably related to a legitimate 
governmental objective, it does not, without more, amount to 
‘punishment.’”35  The Court did not specify exactly what legitimate 
governmental objectives are, but did mention several objectives that are 
not legitimate, including retribution and deterrence.36  
 
[12]  One of the most important and relevant aspects of the Court’s 
decision in Wolfish was the two-fold test it employed for identifying 
unconstitutional punishment at the pretrial stage of the criminal 
proceeding.  First, the court must look for an express intent to punish on 
the part of the detention facility officials.37  If the court does not make 
such a finding, the inquiry then turns upon “whether an alternative purpose 
to which [the restriction] may rationally be connected is assignable for it, 
                                               
30
 Id. at 533. 
31
 Id. 
32
 Id. at 535.   
33
 Id. (citations omitted). 
34
 Id. at 545.   
35
 Id. at 539.  
36
 Id. at 539 n.20 (citing Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963)).   
37
 Id. at 538. 
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and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose 
assigned [to it].”38   
 
[13]  In other words, the Court in Wolfish allows prison officials to place 
conditions or restrictions on the constitutional rights of pretrial detainees 
as long as those conditions or restrictions are “reasonably related to a 
legitimate government objective.”39  If there is a reasonable relation 
between the measure and a legitimate governmental purpose the measure 
will not be found to be punishment, “without more.”40  This is an 
important point because the “more,” according to Wolfish, may invalidate 
a measure, even if it is found to be reasonably related to a legitimate 
government purpose.41  The “more” may include: 
 
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative 
disability or restraint, whether it has historically 
been regarded as a punishment, whether it comes 
into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its 
operation will promote the traditional aims of 
punishment – retribution and deterrence, whether 
the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, 
whether an alternative purpose to which it may 
rationally be connected is assignable for it, and 
whether it appears excessive in relation to the 
alternative purpose assigned . . . .42 
 
Using this reasoning, the Wolfish majority held that the practice of placing 
more than one detainee in each cell did not amount to a level of discomfort 
high enough to constitute a constitutional violation.43  
[14]  In Graham v. Connor, the Supreme Court held that the right to be 
free from excessive force was a guaranteed right that derived from an 
unspecified source in the Constitution.44  That case involved the use of 
                                               
38
 Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963).    
39
 Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 539.  
40
 Id.    
41
 Demery v. Arpaio, 378 F.3d 1020, 1036-37 (9th Cir. 2004).   
42
 Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963).   
43
 Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 541. 
44
 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989). 
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excessive force by law enforcement officials during arrest and seizure.45  
In Graham, the Court affirmed Wolfish by reiterating that the Due Process 
Clause protects a pretrial detainee from the use of excessive force that 
amounts to punishment.46  The Court held, however, that it has not 
“resolved the question [of] whether the Fourth Amendment continues to 
provide individuals with protection against the deliberate use of excessive 
physical force beyond the point at which arrest ends and pretrial detention 
begins, and we do not attempt to answer that question today.”47   
 
[15]  As a result, in Graham, the Court left the door open as to whether the 
Fourth Amendment provides any protection for individuals beyond their 
initial arrest.  With Wolfish, the Court held that pretrial detainees may not 
be punished by the states according to the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, but exactly what amounts to punishment is open 
to debate.  Any use of excessive force after conviction is regulated by the 
Eighth Amendment.48 
 
II. THE FACTS OF DEMERY 
 
[16]  Joe Arpaio, sheriff of Maricopa County, Arizona, installed four 
webcams in his jailhouse, announcing that the public “has the right to 
know what’s going on in our jails…. And I believe that they act as a tool 
to deter crime.  We hope that the only visit people make to our jail is a 
virtual visit.”49  In July of 2000, the webcams began streaming live images 
of pre-trial detainees to Internet users.50  The webcams were installed in 
areas that were inaccessible to the public except by prearranged tour, and 
were installed adjacent to the facility’s closed-circuit security cameras.51  
The four cameras allowed the public to view a holding cell, the hallway 
outside of the holding cells, the pre-intake area (where detainees are 
photographed, fingerprinted and booked), and the intake search area 
(which showed pretrial detainees being patted down).52   
                                               
45
 Id.  
46
 Id. at 395 n.10.   
47Id.  
48
 Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986).   
49
 Demery v. Arpaio, 378 F.3d 1020, 1024 (9th Cir. 2004). 
50
 Id.  
51
 Id.  
52
 Id.  
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[17]  To make the images available to the public, Sheriff Arpaio set up an 
arrangement with a website called “Crime.com.”53  The website contained 
the following message to visitors: “if you find yourself sitting on this 
bunk, you probably have been arrested for drunk and disorderly behavior, 
drug possession, spousal abuse, or prostitution. Most people inside the 
Madison Street Jail are facing misdemeanor charges, but Deputies see 
their fair share of murderers as well.”54   
 
[18]  To view the webcam images, visitors to the Crime.com website had 
to click on a series of links.55  Visitors to the website were able to meet a 
virtual Sheriff Arpaio, receive a virtual tour of the jail, watch current 
conditions in the jail, and view footage of the jail’s first shakedown in four 
years.56  The website recorded more than six million hits during its first 
days of operation, from visitors as far away as Germany, Britain and 
Sweden.57   
 
[19]  Twenty-four former jail detainees brought suit, challenging the 
constitutionality of the webcam policy under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.58  The former inmates argued that public access to the 
webcam footage is the type of punishment that courts prevent 
governments from imposing on unconvicted detainees.59  Sheriff Arpaio 
countered with several arguments, including that the webcams deterred 
crime and furthered the public’s interest in government transparency and 
accountability by allowing the public to scrutinize activities it the pre-trial 
detention center.60  The trial court agreed with the inmates and enjoined 
the use of the webcam.61   
 
[20]  The Ninth Circuit court affirmed the trial court’s decision.  
According to the majority, the intrusion resulting from the webcam 
                                               
53
 Id.   
54
 Id.   
55
 Id. 
56
 Id. at 1024-25.  
57
 Id. at 1025.  
58
 Id. 
59
 Id. at 1028.   
60
 Id. at 1030-31. 
61
 Id. at 1023.  
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transmission was exponentially greater than the “intrusion inherent in 
incarceration.”62  After finding that the web images constituted a harm, the 
court then determined that the harm did not serve a “legitimate 
governmental purpose.”63  As a result, according to the Ninth Circuit, “the 
webcams are not reasonably related to a non punitive purpose,” and were 
therefore an unconstitutional violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
substantive due process rights of pretrial detainees.64   
 
III. ANALYSIS 
 
[21]  The issues raised for analysis in Demery are whether webcams in jail 
houses actually amount to a constitutional infringement of fundamental 
rights that pretrial detainees retain, and what effect Demery will have on 
the constitutional status of pretrial detainees. 
 
A. DOES THE USE OF WEBCAMS IN A JAIL CELL ACTUALLY AMOUNT TO A 
CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION 
 
[22]  In Wolfish, the Supreme Court held that pretrial detainees may not be 
subject to punishment under the Fourteenth Amendment.65  While Wolfish 
did not enumerate exactly what punishment means, it did give guidance in 
determining whether an action constitutes punishment.66  However, the 
Court did hold that a restriction or condition placed on a detainee does not 
in itself amount to an unconstitutional punishment.67  The circuit courts 
have been left with the task of determining when a restriction or condition 
is a constitutional violation.   
 
[23]  This was the task faced by the Ninth Circuit in Demery v. Arpaio.68  
Demery introduced a new twist in the uneven jurisprudence of pretrial 
detainee rights by implicating the Internet and technology.69  The question 
in Demery was whether the use of a webcam to film pretrial detainees 
                                               
62
 Id. at 1030.   
63
 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 (1979).   
64
 Demery, 378 F.3d at 1033.   
65
 Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 535.   
66
 Id. at 538.    
67
 Id. at 536-37.   
68
 Demery, 378 F.3d 1020. 
69
 Id. 
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amounted to an unconstitutionally condition or restriction on those 
detainees’ rights.70   
 
[24]  In Demery, the majority undertook the two-step analysis of Wolfish 
by looking first at whether the webcams caused the detainee to suffer 
some harm or disability.71  The court reasoned that “exposure to million of 
complete strangers... as one is booked, fingerprinted, and generally 
processed as an arrestee, and as one sits, stands, or lies in a holding cell, 
constitutes a level of humiliation that almost anyone would regard as 
profoundly undesirable and strive to avoid.”72  To the majority, that 
exposure constituted a punishment in addition to the harm that is inherent 
to being incarcerated in the first place.73  The court, however, did not rely 
upon other sources or precedent in making its determination that this 
exposure rose to the level of a constitutional violation.   
 
[25]  Once it determined that the webcam transmissions constituted a 
harm, the Ninth Circuit then turned to the issue of whether the harm was 
imposed “for the purpose of punishment or whether it is but an incident of 
some other legitimate governmental purpose.”74  This is a rational-relation 
standard, and it typically affords the government significant deference.75 
When the court employs a rational relation test, only in rare situations will 
it not uphold the government’s arguments.76  In Demery, however, the 
court examined the claims of the government and dismissed them one by 
one.  In doing so, the court seemed to use analysis more analogous to the 
compelling necessity standard that was dismissed by the Supreme Court in 
Wolfish than the rational relationship test that it should have employed.   
 
[26]  First, the majority in its analysis held that webcams did not improve 
the security of the prison as Sheriff Arpaio claimed.77  The jail already 
contained a closed-circuit surveillance system, and because the webcams 
                                               
70
 Id. 
71
 Demery, 378 F.3d at 1029.    
72
 Id. at 1029-30.   
73
 Id. at 1030. 
74
 Id. at 1030 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 538 (1979)). 
75
 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 646 (2d ed. 
2002).   
76
 Id.   
77Demery, 378 F.3d at 1030. 
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were placed next to the closed-circuit cameras, they did not increase the 
size of the area being surveilled.78  The court then dismissed the Sheriff’s 
argument that the webcams deterred crime because the public, after 
viewing the webcam footage, would decide to avoid engaging in activities 
that lead to arrest and incarceration.79  The court, in reliance upon Wolfish, 
stated that this claim had to fail because “‘[r]etribution and deterrence are 
not legitimate nonpunitive governmental objectives’ that can justify 
adverse conditions of detention for pretrial detainees.”80  The court also 
relied on its own precedent in White v. Roper, where it held that deterrence 
does not qualify as a nonpunitive goal for pretrial detainees.81  Deterrence 
of crime is typically a legitimate governmental objective, but “where an 
individual is incarcerated before trial but has not been convicted of any 
crime, imposing adverse conditions during his detention as a means of 
deterring crime is not permissible.”82   
 
[27]  The Ninth Circuit also dismissed the Sheriff’s final main argument 
that the cameras furthered the public’s interest in government transparency 
and accountability.83  Although facilitating public scrutiny is a legitimate 
government interest, the court said that it failed to understand how turning 
pretrial detainees into the “unwilling objects of the latest reality show 
serves any of these legitimate goals.”84  As a result, according to the Ninth 
Circuit, the normally valid governmental interest in assuring 
accountability and public scrutiny does not stand up in this case.85   
 
[28]  The court concluded by stating that the webcams are not “reasonably 
related to a non-punitive purpose.”86  It does seem, however, that at least 
one of the arguments advanced by Sheriff Arpaio is rationally related to 
legitimate non-punitive governmental purposes.  The Sheriff’s argument 
that carried the most weight was his contention that the webcams provided 
                                               
78
 Id. 
79
 Id. 
80
 Id. at 1030-31 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 n.20 (1979)). 
81
 White v. Roper, 901 F.2d 1501, 1504-05 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 
U.S. 520, 539 n.20 (1979)). 
82
 Demery, 378 F.3d at 1031. 
83
 Id.   
84
 Id.  
85
 Id. at 1032.   
86
 Id. at 1033.   
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greater transparency to governmental operations of the facility, which they 
surely did.  With the webcams in place, it would be difficult for any type 
of abuse of detainees to take place because, at any given moment, 
thousands of people could be monitoring the activities inside the jail.  As 
the dissent noted, the jail also allowed prearranged tours of the jail facility 
that allowed the pretrial detainees to be viewed by those members of the 
public in the tour group.87  The main difference between the webcams and 
those tours “is surely a matter of degree, left to the discretion of an elected 
official, restrained only by notions of whether choice of the larger number 
of viewers makes the measure ‘excessive’ under [Wolfish].”88  As a result, 
the webcams provided nearly the same function as the prearranged tours, 
except that millions, rather than dozens, of people were able to watch.   
 
[29]  If the transparency argument is at all true, the court should have 
concluded under the deferential rationale relation test that the use of the 
webcam was permissible.  Instead, the majority struck down even this 
seemingly rational and legitimate governmental purpose.  In so doing, the 
court’s rationale seemed to be that it is wrong on a constitutional and 
moral basis to expose individuals who have been convicted of no crime to 
a level of shame and humiliation analogous to that of those who have been 
convicted of a crime.  However, the court’s decision seems to indicate a 
rejection of the rationale relationship test of Wolfish.  
 
[30]  Under Fourteenth Amendment Due Process analysis, courts typically 
look first for a substantive right and second for whether that right has been 
violated.89  If the court finds a substantive right, it uses a strict level of 
scrutiny of the government action implicated.90  If the right is 
fundamental, the government must present a compelling interest to justify 
the infringement.91  If, however, the right is not fundamental, the law will 
be upheld if it is demonstrated that it has merely a legitimate purpose.92  
Under strict scrutiny, the government must not only demonstrate that the 
                                               
87
 Id. at 1036 (Bea, J., dissenting).   
88
 Id.   
89
 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 75, at 764. 
90
 Id. 
91
 Id. at 767. 
92
 Id.   
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law has a compelling purpose, it must also show that the law is necessary 
to accomplish that compelling purpose.93 
 
[31]  In this case involving webcams and pretrial detainees, it is not easy 
to identify exactly one constitutional right that has been violated.  
However, it does seem that their right to privacy was violated, which the 
Supreme Court has deemed a fundamental right.94  As unconvicted 
criminals, detainees should retain the right that we all have to not be 
filmed or exposed to public humiliation.95  Detainees are not, as the 
Supreme Court stated, “animals in a zoo to be filmed and photographed at 
will by the public or by media reporters.”96   
 
B. WHAT AFFECT WILL THIS RULING HAVE ON THE TREATMENT OF PRETRIAL 
DETAINEES? 
 
[32]  It was doubtful after Wolfish if courts would again examine prison 
actions that might have violated detainees’ constitutional rights.97  
However, with Demery, the Ninth Circuit took up the issue of detainees’ 
rights and ruled in their favor, thereby expanding protection for those who 
have yet to be convicted of a crime.98   
 
[33]  The Ninth Circuit’s decision may subtlety indicate a rejection of 
Wolfish’s rational relationship test and the beginning of a return to the 
compelling necessity standard.  The Demery court struck down all the 
governmental interests that burdened the detainees’ rights as 
unconstitutional.99  After Demery, it is difficult to imagine a legitimate 
nonpunitive use of webcams that would be considered constitutional.  The 
court struck down a seemingly legitimate governmental objective using 
what is typically an extremely deferential standard of review.100  As a 
                                               
93
 Id. 
94
 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).    
95
 See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614 (1999) (“It is a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment for police to bring members of the media or other third parties into a home 
during the execution of a warrant when the presence of the third parties in the home was 
not in aid of the execution of the warrant.”).   
96
 Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 5 n.2 (1978).   
97
 Bosworth, supra note 2, at 283.   
98
 Demery v. Arpaio, 378 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2004). 
99
 Id. 
100
 Id. 
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result, it would appear that the court, in fact, used a higher level of review 
than the one called for in Wolfish.  
 
[34]  Clearly a constitutional gray area exists here.  Those who have been 
arrested are detained because there is probable cause that they actually 
committed the crime for which they were arrested.101  They do not have all 
the freedoms that non-incarcerated people have.  The Court has held that 
the act of being detained prior to trial does not in itself violate one’s 
constitutional rights.102  However, just because someone has been 
incarcerated does not automatically mean that they are guilty of a crime.  
Because of this, courts should err on the side of protecting the rights of 
these detainees.  To best protect the rights of those who have yet to be 
convicted of a crime, courts need to firmly return to the presumption of 
innocence, and subject the actions of prison officials to a strict level of 
constitutional scrutiny.  Contrary to one of the holdings of Wolfish, the 
presumption of innocence should apply to pretrial detainees.  Courts 
should return to the compelling necessity standard that was used prior to 
Bell v. Wolfish.  Demery may signal the beginning of a shift back to a level 
of review that places a higher burden on government officials.   
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
[35]  The majority in Demery relied upon the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Wolfish when making its ruling, but in fact seems to have used a 
constitutional level of review higher than what was mandated by Wolfish.  
This decision may indicate a shift in thinking back to the compelling 
necessity standard used by many of the circuit courts before being struck 
down by Wolfish.  The scope of this case is limited, as it is mandatory 
authority only for the lower courts of the Ninth Circuit.  However, it could 
have a more widespread effect as persuasive authority for the other circuit 
courts across the country.  In at least the Ninth Circuit, however, those 
who have yet to be convicted of a crime cannot be treated as though they 
have, at least in regard to being the unwilling participants in an online 
“reality show.”103 
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[36]  With the rise of the Internet, it is likely that there will be more 
clashes between such technology and the Constitution.  However, as one 
commentator noted, Demery “represents an instance where the power of 
the Internet does not trump constitutional protections.”104   
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